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Comments
The California Approach to the Yielding
of the Newsman's Shield Law
Recently, two California District Courts of Appeal' have been
faced with the task of reconciling the First Amendment rights of
newsmen with the Sixth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant
to a fair trial. In response to the newsmen's claim that the Cali-
fornia Newsmen's Shield Law2 and the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution8 entitled members of the press to refuse
to reveal their sources of information, the Court issued citations
for contempt on the ground that the press is not guaranteed an
absolute right to publish information not available to the general
public and that therefore the newsmen could be compelled to dis-
close confidential sources.
This comment will examine the standards applied by the Califor-
nia judiciary in balancing the basic interests involved in the
confrontation between free press and fair trial: the First Amend-
ment protection to newsmen, the scope of the privilege afforded
by the California Newsmen's Shield Law, the Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial in criminal cases and the inherent power of
1. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427
(1975); Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971)
(hearing denied March 20, 1972; cert. denied 409 U.S. 1011 (1972)).
2. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1976); see notes 16 and 37 infra.
3. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 377 (1966).
the judiciary to control its proceedings and officers in order to pre-
vent prejudicial publicity from emanating from court officers.
In striking a balance between the interests of members of the
press and criminal defendants several relevant factors must be
considered: (1) whether judicial history requires actual harm to
be done before restrictions of the press are valid; (2) whether the
trial in issue involves the drastic situation of Sheppard,4 Estes"
or RideauO; (3) whether the trial court's application of a protective
('gag') order attempts to control parties not subject to it; (4)
whether the existence of alternative sources for the information
sought have been explored and exhausted; and (5) whether the
existence of alternative methods which would have the least effect
on the dissemination of information has been determined.
In attempting to balance the interests involved when the possi-
bility exists that the press may have jeopardized the right of a
criminal defendant to a fair trial, the Supreme Court of the United
States has handed down a number of decisions discussing and
weighing these factors.7 Although it has been repeatedly recog-
nized that the freedom exists to insure the unimpeded dissemination
of information s newspapers in the enjoyment of their constitu-
tional rights may not deprive accused persons of their right to a
fair trial9 nor obstruct the administration of justice by preventing
the impartiality of the judiciary.10 As a result of too many
instances of pre-trial publicity corrupting the fairness of the trial,
protective orders were implemented."
4. Id. The massive pretrial and trial publicity turned the courtroom
into a 'Roman Holiday' for the news media.
5. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
6. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
7. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Beck v. Washing-
ton, 369 U.S. 541 (1962); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Marshall v.
United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
8. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
269 (1964).
9. Sheppard v. State of Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 53 (1951); see also
Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
10. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237
U.S. 309 (1915) (outlaw of mob domination of a courtroom); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (prohibition against manual coercion of defend-
ant); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (protection of the impartiality
of the presiding judge); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939) (prohibi-
tion against discriminatory selection of jurors); see also People v. Fain, 18
Cal. App. 3d 137, 95 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1971); People v. Byers, 10 Cal. App.
3d 410, 88 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1970).
11. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). See text infra at -.
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The California cases of Farr v. Superior Court 12 and Rosato v.
Superior Court13 serve as appropriate vehicles to examine the Cali-
fornia approach to the free press-fair trial controversy and spe-
cifically to demonstrate how the application of protective orders
has encroached upon the freedom of the press in California to
publish before and during a criminal trial.
In 1970, William T. Farr, a reporter for the Los Angeles Herald
Examiner, was sent to cover the trial of Charles Manson and his
codefendants for two sets of multiple murders. Early in the pro-
ceedings the superior court entered an Order re Publicity.14 Dur-
ing the course of the trial Farr obtained copies of the statement
of a potential witness from several unidentified sources who were
all allegedly subject to the protective order. 5 Subsequently an
12. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971) (hearing denied March
20, 1972; cert. denied 409 U.S. 1011 (1972); In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577;
111 Cal. Rptr.649 (1974); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975).
13. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975).
14. The protective order prohibited any attorney, court employee, at-
tache, or witness from releasing for public dissemination the content or na-
ture of any testimony that might be given at trial or any evidence the ad-
missibility of which might have to be determined by the court. The order
became effective on December 10, 1969 and remained in effect until the ter-
mination of the trial, April, 1970. As an additional precaution against
prejudicial publicity, the jury was sequestered for the length of the trial.
The trial court felt that the brutal nature of the crimes and the intense
pretrial coverage by the press created a climate that extrajudicial state-
ments would constitute a clear and present danger to the administration
of justice and therefore necessitated the Order in Re Publicity.
Although the scope of this paper does not include an in-depth analysis
of the appropriate standards to be considered in issuing a protective ('gag')
order nor of the validity of the orders issued in the cases discussed, it should
be noted that the American Bar Association's Legal Advisory Committee
on Fair Trial and Free Press is revamping its guidelines on the issuance
of gag orders in order to include notice and hearing to the news media be-
fore a gag order is issued. See "Proposed Court Procedure for Fair Trial-
Free Press Judicial Restrictive Orders" (July 1975).
For the California approach see Warren & Abell, Free Press-Fair Trial:
'The Gag Order', A California Aberration, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 51 (1972).
15. The Graham statement purported to report a confession made to
Graham by Susan Atkins, a Manson co-defendant. The confession impli-
cated Manson and revealed plans to murder several show business personal-
ities in a bizarre manner. Farr contacted each of the attorneys involved
in the trial and received copies of the statement from three persons subject
to the protective order. Although Farr was aware of the Order re Publicity,
he felt he knew all of the information in the Graham statement as a result
of his conversations with Ms. Graham and others, and, therefore, only
in-chambers hearing was held by the trial court to ascertain the
identity of the persons who had given copies to Farr. Farr refused
to disclose his sources pursuant to Section 1070 of the California
Evidence Code.1 6 After the judgment in the Manson case, 17 Farr
was again called as a witness in a hearing convened by the trial
court to determine whether there had been a violation of its protec-
tive order which might have jeopardized the right to a fair trial
for Manson and his codefendants. Farr again remained silent pur-
suant to Section 1070.18 This time the Court held Farr to be in
direct contempt, ordering him incarcerated until he answered the
questions.' 9
wanted to corroborate the information he had obtained prior to publishing
it (a customary procedure of the news media). Bill Farr, "The First
Amendment Behind Bars", Northrup University Law School Lecture Series,
Oct. 20, 1975 (Hereinafter cited as Northrup Lecture).
16. CAL. EvmD. CODE § 1070 (West 1966) provided in pertinent part:
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or
employed upon a newspaper, or by a press association or wire
service, cannot be adjudged in contempt by a court, the Legisla-
ture, or any administrative body, for refusing to disclose the source
of any information procured for publication and published in a
newspaper.
See note 37 infra for § 1070 as amended by Stats. 1974, c. 1456, p. 3184,
§ 2.
In response to Farr's argument, the trial judge's legal advice was that
§ 1070 provided a shield to newsmen, and therefore, any disclosure would
be on a voluntary basis. See In Chambers Transcript: p. 8, lines 7-28. The
trial judge commented that under § 1070 of CAL. EvID. CODE[T] hat while I could not order you, that is effectively, order you to
disclose the source, there is nothing to prevent you in the inter-
ests of justice and an aid in the administration of justice from
voluntarily revealing it without waiving any right in the future to
asert that immunity or privilege.
Farr published the statement one day before the witness took the stand.
The trial court made no attempt to enjoin the publication or to inquire of
the persons subject to the order the trial judge's initial interest was in see-
ing that those who violated the Order re Publicity be dealt with.
17. Manson and his codefendants were found guilty of murder and were
sentenced to death. An automatic appeal to the Supreme Court is now
pending.
18. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966).
19. CAL. CODE CIrv. PRO. § 1209, subds. 5, 8, 9 (West 1972). The purpose
of holding Farr in contempt was to maintain the dignity and authority of
the court and to compel compliance by members of the press. See In re
Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 583-84, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649, 653 (1974); In re Lif-
schutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 439 n. 27, 467 P.2d 557, 573, n. 27 85 Cal. Rptr. 829,
845, n. 27 (1970); Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 484, 94 P.2d
983-993-94 (1939).
See CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 1219 (West 1972) which provides:
When the contempt consists in the omission to perform an act
which is yet in the power of the person to perform, he may be
imprisoned until he (has) performed it, and in that case the act
must be specified in the warrant of commitment.
Farr subsequently petitioned the Federal District Court and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals for federal habeas corpus. See Farr v. Pitchess,
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In Rosato, four Fresno Bee newsmen were held in contempt upon
refusing to answer questions. These questions were propounded
by the trial court during a proceeding held to investigate possible
violations of protective and seal orders issued by the court with
respect to the transcript of grand jury testimony.20
The underlying purpose for protective orders in California is to
protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.21 Although in both
522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975). In the meantime he was released on per-
sonal recognizance by the former Mr. Justice Douglas; see Farr v. Pitchess,
409 U.S. 1245 (1973). He is currently appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In a subsequent hearing by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County
any future incarceration was limited to five days; the Court found that there
was an absence of a substantial likelihood that continued commitment
would accomplish the purpose of the order upon which the commitment
was based. See In re McKinney, 70 Cal. 2d 8, 10-11, 447 P.2d 972, 973-74,
73 Cal. Rptr. 580, 582-83 (1968).
CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 1218 (West 1972) provides in pertinent part:
Upon the answer and evidence taken, the court or judge must
determine whether the person proceeded against is guilty of the
contempt charged, and if it be adjudged that he is guilty of the
contempt, a fine may be imposed on him not exceeding five hun-
dred ($500), or he may be imprisoned not exceeding five days, or
both ...
20. Pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 938.1 subd. (b) (West Supp. 1976)
the trial court ordered the grand jury transcripts to be sealed until the com-
pletion of the defendant's trial as well as issuing an Order re Publicity simi-
lar to the one in the Manson trial. CAL. PENAL CODE § 938.1, subd. (b),
provides in pertinent part:
If the court determines that there is a reasonable likelihood
that making all or any part of the transcript public may prejudice
a defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial, that part of the
transcript shall be sealed until the defendant's trial has been
completed.
It is also interesting to note that the protective order was issued on the
basis of the "reasonable likelihood test"; see note 14, supra and note 64,
infra.
In Craemer v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 225, 71 Cal. Rptr.
193, 201 (1968), the court noted that the trial judge did not base his order
sealing the transcript of grand jury proceedings on the "reasonable likeli-
hood" that prejudicial publicity would endanger defendant's right to a fair
trial but on the 'probability' of such prejudice. And in People v. Tidwell,
3 Cal. 3d 62, 69, 473 P.2d 748, 753, 89 Cal. Rptr. 44, 49 (1970), the court
stated that "reasonable likelihood" does not mean that prejudice must be
more probable than not.
The "reasonable likelihood" standard has basically been used with re-
gards to motions for change of venue in criminal cases. See, Maine v. Su-
perior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 375, 383, 438 P.2d 372, 377, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724, 729
(1968); Frazier v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d, 287, 486 P.2d 694, 95 Cal. Rptr.
798 (1971).
21. See WAR N & ABELL, supra note 14.
Farr and Rosato the orders were disobeyed, there was no definitive
finding that the publications ever reached the Manson jury,22 that
there was any particular difficulty in impaneling an impartial jury
in the Stefano trial,23 or any determination that any of the defend-
ants were denied a fair trial as a direct result of these publications.
The Second District Court of Appeal of California refers only to
the "likely possibility" that the question of prejudicial publicity
would be an issue on appeal in the Manson trial,24 and the Fifth
District Court of Appeal's basic concern was to prohibit any public
dissemination of out-of-court statements that "may" interfere with
a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. 25  The most
recent California decisions seem to address themselves more to the
importance of the courts not being thwarted in their efforts to
enforce protective orders rather than to the findings of any actual
interference with the defendants' right to a fair trial, a standard
that federal 26 as well as California 27 courts have previously and
consistently used in determining whether or not to reverse criminal
convictions in light of prejudicial publicity.
Although the violation of a protective order demonstrates disre-
gard for judicial authority, this should not automatically suggest
that the defendant has been denied due process or that the fairness
22. California evinces a policy of permitting acceptance of jurors who,
after contact with pretrial news reports, commit themselves to impartiality
and fairness. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1076 (West 1970); see also People
v. Duncan, 53 Cal. 2d 803, 812-16, 350 P.2d 103, 108-10, 3 Cal. Rptr. 351,
356-58 (1960); People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal. 2d 876, 889-90, 256 P.2d 911,
918-19 (1953); People v. Miller, 245 Cal. App. 2d 112, 53 Cal. Rptr. 720
(1966); People v. Parker, 235 Cal. App. 2d 100, 44 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
23. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 207-08, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 438-39. Since the
Fresno Bee publications occurred prior to trial, the court was concerned
with the "reasonable likelihood" of prejudicial news which would make dif-
ficult the impaneling of an impartial jury and 'tend' to prevent a fair trial.
24. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 66, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
25. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 200, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 433.
26. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,
723 (1961); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Stroble v. Cali-
fornia, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 204 (5th Cir.
1975). It should be noted that other United States Supreme Court cases
have reversed convictions without actual prejudice in the jury box in ex-
treme situations where there has been inherently prejudicial publicity to
make the possibility of prejudice highly likely. See Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisi-
ana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
27. People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1972); People v. Santo, 43 Cal. 2d 319, 273 P.2d 249 (1954); People v.
Gomez, 41 Cal. 2d 150, 258 P.2d 825 (1953); People v. Byers, 10 Cal. App.
3d 410, 88 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1970); People v. Richardson, 258 Cal. App. 2d
23, 65 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1968); Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. App.
2d 670, 62 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1967).
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of a trial is fatally infected. 28 As the United States Supreme
Court has held in the past:
Due process of law requires that the proceedings shall be fair but
fairness is a relative, not an absolute concept . . . what is fair in
one set of circumstances may be an act of tyranny in others. 29
Although in some circumstances a violation of a protective order
will directly affect the fairness of a criminal trial, a careful exami-
nation of the facts in each case is necessary before coming to that
conclusion. Therefore, before a court concludes that pretrial or
pending trial publications are prejudicial, it should find an actual
interference and not merely a tendency to interfere with a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial. The protection given to First Amend-
ment rights should be at least equal to that given to Sixth Amend-
ment rights.
Although under the common law there was no privilege to
conceal confidential sources of information3 0 and the prevailing
view among members of the bench and bar has been generally
opposed to a journalist's privilege,8 1 newsmen have refused to dis-
close sources and information through the years on several grounds
including self incrimination,3 2 forfeiture of estate,33 newsman's
ethic code,34 and the First Amendment right to a confidential rela-
28. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
29. Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116-17
(1934); see also Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975).
30. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 at 537 nn. 13 & 14 (McNaughton rev.
1961). However this was not always the rule at common law. In 17th cen-
tury England, the obligations of honor among gentlemen were occasionally
recognized as privileged from compulsory disclosure information obtained
in exchange for a promise of confidence. But see Duchess of Kingston's
Case, 12 Coke 94 (1913) which required disclosure and answers to all ques-
tions to avoid being held in contempt.
31. ABA REPORT ON THE COMMITTEE ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW
Or EVIDENCE (1937-38).
32. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915); A.L. Sloan (unre-
ported), see Editor & Publisher, Aug. 11, 1934 at 10; Plunkett v. Hamilton,
136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); Pledger v. State, 77 Ga. 242, 3 S.E. 320 (1887);
Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919).
33. Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); Frank v.
Toughill (unreported), see Editor & Publisher, Dec. 9, 1933, at 16.
34. In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (Supp. Ct. 1913); People
ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 199 N.E. 415 (1936); Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo.
297, 184 P. 375 (1919); Matter of Wayne, 4 Haw. 475 (D. Haw. 1914); Clin-
ton v. Commercial Tribune Co., 11 Ohio Dec. 603 (1901); Ex Parte Lawrence
& Levings, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897); People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179,
tionship with sources.35 In addition, notice should also be taken
of the newer trend toward extending a testimonial privilege to
newsmen through legislation. 0
48 P. 75 (1897); People ex rel. Phelps v. Fancher, 2 Hun. 226 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1874); Burkett, Hendricks & Nevin (unreported), N.Y. Times, Oct. 31,
1929, p. 14, Col. 3. Noted in 36 VA. L. Rsv. 61, 71 (1950). The American
Newspaper Guild has adopted the following rule as part of the newsman's
code of ethics: "Newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or dis-
close sources of confidential information in court or before other judicial
or investigating bodies." See G. BIRD & F. MERWIN, THE PRESS AND SOCIETY
592 (1971).
35. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958); cert. denied 358 U.S.
910 (1958). Although the testimonial privilege was denied, the court did
recognize a newsman's First Amendment right to a confidential relationship
with his source and concluded:
It is to be noted that we are not dealing here with the use of the
judicial process to force a wholesale disclosure of a newspaper's
confidential sources of news, nor with a case where the identity of
the news source is of doubtful relevance or materiality .... The
question asked . . . went to the heart of the plaintiff's claim.
Garland v. Torre, supra at 549-50. Other courts have recently recognized
the First Amendment privilege. See Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d
778 (2d Cir. 1972); Democratic National Committee v. McCord, 356 F. Supp.
1394 (D.D.C. 1973); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429
(1974); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974).
36. Thus far seventeen states have provided some type of statutory pro-
tection to a newsman's confidential sources: ALA. CODE, Tit. 7 § 370 (1960);
ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150 (1973); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp.
1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); CAL. EviD.; CODE § 1070 (West Supp.
1976); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); KY. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1972);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-1454 (Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE, Art.
35, § 2 (1971); MICH. Coamp. LAWS § 767.5a (Supp. 1956), MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 28.945 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-601-2 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 49.275 (1973); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:84A-21, 2A:84A-29 (1976); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (1970); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (Supp. 1975); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (1954); PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1975).
See D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential
Sources of Information, 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 307 (1969) for an in depth analysis
of the statutes.
Although none has been provided by federal statute, such legislation has
been introduced. See, e.g., S. 1311, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971); S. 3552, 91st
Cong. 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 16328, H.R. 16704, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970);
S. 1851, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 8519, H.R. 7787, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963); S. 965, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 355, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1959). An example of the legislation being introduced:
A witness who is employed by 'a newspaper, news service, news-
paper syndicate, periodical or radio or TV station or network, as
a writer, reporter, correspondent, or commentator or in any other
capacity directly involved in the gathering or presentation of news,
shall not be required in any court of the United States to disclose
the source of any information obtained in such capacity unless in
the opinion of the court such disclosure is necessary in the inter-
ests of national security. (emphasis added)
See Staff of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 2d, The News-
man's Privilege (Comm. Print 1966).
A set of guidelines for federal officials in connection with subpoening
members of the press to testify before grand juries or at criminal trials has
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The California legislature has responded affirmatively to the
'newer trend' by enacting Section 1070 of the Evidence Code.37 Al-
though there is no legislative history available and minimal judi-
cial interpretation 38 to provide a definitive statement as to the pur-
been designed by Attorney General Edward H. Levi. In addressing a joint
national conference of U.S. attorneys and U.S. marshals (November 1975)
Levi warned that they must get his prior approval before sending subpoenas
to news reporters to reveal their confidential sources in trials and before
grand juries. In his speech Levi gave U.S. attorneys personal orders that
have been spelled out in Justice Department guidelines. The Guidelines
for Subpoenas to the News Media were first announced on August 10, 1970
in a speech by the Attorney General, and then were expressed in Depart-
ment of Justice Memo. No. 692 (Sept. 2, 1970), which was sent to all United
States Attorneys. The guidelines state:
The Department of Justice recognizes that compulsory process in
some circumstances may have a limiting effect on the exercise of
First Amendment rights. In determining whether to request is-
suance of a subpoena to the press, the approach in every case must
be to weigh that limiting effect against the public interest to be
served in the fair administration of justice .... The Department
of Justice does not consider the press an investigative arm of the
government. Therefore, all reasonable attempt should be made to
obtain information from non-press sources before there is any con-
sideration of subpoening the press.
37. The first shield law was enacted by an amendment, in 1935, to
former Code of Civil Procedure § 1881 which listed certain privileges
against giving testimony. In 1965, the provisions of subdivision 6 of the
Code of Civil Procedure § 1881 became Evidence Code § 1070. Since 1965,
section 1070 has been amended by Stats. 1971, c. 1717, p. 3658, § ; Stats. 1972,
c. 1431, p. 3126, § ; Stats. 974, c. 323, p. 2877, § 1; Stats. 1974, c. 1456, p
3184, § 2. Subdivision (a) of section 1070 of CAL. Evm. CODE provides:
(a) A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected
with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical
publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any person
who has been so connected or employed, cannot be adjudged in
contempt by a judicial, legislative, administrative body, or any
other body having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to
disclose, in any proceeding as defined in Section 901, the source
of any iniformation procured while so connected or employed for
publication in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical publica-
tion, or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information ob-
tained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of infor-
mation for communication to the public.
See supra, note 16 for text of § 1070 (West 1970) when Farr initially refused
to disclose his sources.
38. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966), Comment-Assembly Com-
mittee on Judiciary notes that § 1070 provides an immunity from being
adjudged in contempt; that it does not create a privilege; thus, it does not
prevent the use of other sanctions for refusal of a newsman to make dis-
covery when he is a party to a civil proceeding. See Application of Cepeda,
233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (guided by rule of strict statutory con-
struction; therefore, did not extend the 'immunity' to magazines); Ex parte
pose behind the statute, there are enough guidelines present to
ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the
purpose of the law. 9
California newsmen have contended that they are granted
immunity from punishment for contempt by Evidence Code § 1070
and that their sources are protected from disclosure by a First
Amendment privilege. 40 When the Court of Appeal of California
was presented with this argument their response was:
To construe the statute as granting immunity to petitioner, Farr,
in the face of the facts here present would be to countenance an
unconstitutional interference by legislative branch with an inherent
and vital power of the court to control its own proceedings and
officers.41
An objective reading of the unqualified language of Section 1070
suggests that the purpose and policy behind the statute is to main-
tain a free flow of information by enabling newsmen to obtain
information, not otherwise available, from sources who are inter-
ested in preserving the confidentiality of their disclosure. The lan-
guage of the statute, which is broad enough to provide immunity
in any proceeding in which testimony can be compelled, suggests
that it be construed in conjunction with the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution 42 and with Article I, section 2 of
Lawrence and Levings, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897) (news editor and re-
porter were held in contempt for refusing to disclose information in front
of state senate investigatory committee); People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179,
48 P. 75 (1897) (a criminal defendant's application for contempt proceed-
ings against certain newspaper editors because of their publications relative
to the trial was denied since there was no finding of jury influence); In
re Howard, 136 Cal. App. 2d 816, 289 P.2d 537 (1955) (waiver of privilege
by disclosing source of information).
39. A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a reasonable
interpretation which comports with the objects and purposes of an act will
prevail over an interpretation which would defeat those purposes. Silver
v. Brown, 63 Cal. 2d 841, 845, 409 P.2d 689, 692, 48 Cal. Rptr. 609, 612 (1966);
see also Select Base Materials v. Bd. of Equalization, 51 Cal. 2d 640, 335
P.2d 672 (1959).
40. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427(1975); Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971)(hearing denied March 20, 1972; cert. denied 409 U.S. 1011 (1972)); Lewis
v. Superior Court, - Cal. App. 3d -, - Cal. Rptr. - (1976). (Lewis has
been cited with contempt for refusing to honor a grand jury subpoena di-
recting him to hand over a 'communique' written by the Symbionese Liber-
ation Army. Lewis's refusal was based on the First Amendment and § 1070
of California Evidence Code.
41. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348. The Fifth District Court
of Appeal in Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 223, 124 Cal. Rptr.
427, 448, cites Farr with approval.
42. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of
the press."
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the California Constitution. 43  Nevertheless, in confronting the
clash between the newsman's need for immunity and the court's
power to compel disclosure, the judicial construction of the statute
has rested upon the necessity of disclosure as the means of enforce-
ment of a court's obligation to protect a defendant's right to ,a fair
trial. In refusing to recognize that newsmen have an absolute
privilege to refuse to answer certain questions posited by a trial
court, the court explained:
If Evidence Code section 1070 were to be applied to the matter at
bench to immunize petitioner from liability, that application would
violate the principle of separation of powers established by our
Supreme Court. That application would severely impair the trial
court's discharge of a constitutionally compelled duty to control its
own officers. The trial court was enjoined by controlling precedent
of the United States Supreme Court to take reasonable action to
protect the defendants in the Manson case from the effects of preju-
dicial publicity. (Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 16 L.Ed. 2d
600, 86 S.Ct. 1507.)44
At the present time the California courts will not construe Evidence
Code § 1070 to shield newsmen from contempt for failure to reveal
sources of information where an 'Order re Publicity' has been issued
and possibly violated.
In issuing and enforcing protective orders, the California courts
have relied heavily on the 'mandate of the United States Supreme
Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell' that the trial court control prejudi-
cial publicity to prevent a "circus-type atmosphere" at trial. Since
Sheppard45 is emphasized by the courts, it is relevant to set out
the holding of the Supreme Court at some length:
From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial
news comment on pending trials has become increasingly prevalent.
Due process requires that the accused recieve a trial by an impar-
tial jury free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of
modern communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial
publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take
strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against
the accused.. . . The courts must take such steps by rule and regu-
43. Article I, section 2 of the California Constitution provides that "no
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the
press."
44. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 348;
Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 221, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 447-
48.
45. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
lation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside
interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused,
witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under thejurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its func-
tion. Collaboration between counsel and the press as to informa-
tion affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to
regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary
measures.46
In recognizing that "reversals are but mere palliatives" 4 7 and that
"the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the
prejudice at its inception,"48 the holding in Sheppard sanctions the
utilization of 'protective orders' as an additional means to ensure
a trial free from prejudicial publicity. In brushing aside any con-
sideration of the issue of sanctions against a 'recalcitrant press', the
Supreme Court concluded that less drastic measures would have
been sufficient to guarantee Sheppard a fair trial.49  The Court
also reaffirmed its unwillingness to impose any direct limitations
on the freedom traditionally exercised by the news media,50 since
the Court has consistently required that the press have a free hand,
even though deploring its sensationalism. 51
It is indisputable that a trial judge has the responsibility to
exercise the control necessary to assure a fair trial and is bound
to explore the violations of its order by its own officers.5 2 What
is an unresolved issue is whether a court overextends the holding
in Sheppard in denying to a newsman the immunity of Evidence
46. Id. at 362-63.
47. Id. at 363.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 358-63. The Court suggested the following measures to re-
duce any prejudicial influences on the jury: (1) controls on use of court-
room and the courthouse by the press; (2) insulation of the witnesses from
the press; (3) controls over the release of leads, information, and gossip
to the press by police officers, witnesses, and counsel; (4) warnings to the
press of the impropriety of publishing prejudicial material; (5) continuance
of the case until the threat to a fair trial because of prejudicial news de-
bates or changing the venue to another jurisdiction; and (6) sequestration
of the jury.
50. Craig v. Harney, 334 U.S. 367, 374 (1947); reviewed in Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
51. 384 U.S. at 377.
52. CAL. CODE C-v. PRo. § 128, subds. (3) -(5) (West Supp. 1976) provide
in pertinent part:
3. To provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings, before it,
or its officers;
4. To compel obedience to its judgments, orders and process, and
to the orders of a Judge out of Court, in an action of proceed-
ing pending therein;
5. To control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its mini-
sterial officers, and of all other persons in any manner con-
nected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter
appertaining thereto;
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Code § 1070, since the Supreme Court has not as yet promulgated
any rules directly regulating the activity of the news media. The
determination that the statute is/will be unconstitutional under
some circumstances might have the effect of completely defeating
the concept of a newsman's privilege. The placing of limitations
and restrictions on section 1070 without establishing definitive
guidelines undermines a newsman's right to gather news in that
it creates a degree of uncertainty as to the actual scope of the
privilege. This could potentially influence the press to avoid any
direct confrontation with the judiciary and to discourage the asser-
tion of their 'privilege' within factual circumstances where it might
be recognized. Dicta in Farr exemplifies this possibility where the
court pointed out:
We express no opinion on the quantum of proof required to estab-
lish that inquiry into a newsman's source is necessary to permit
the court to carry out its duty to control its own officers and to
restrict persons subject to its control from disseminating prejudi-
cial trial publicity. Here petitioner has admitted the necessary
facts.53
On the other hand, the Rosato court suggested that the section
remains as a protection against the revelation of all sources other
than court officers subject to orders issued by the court.5 4
The limitations placed upon § 1070 seem to spring from the
inherent power of the judiciary to control its own proceedings and
officers. As the Supreme Court noted in Wood v. Georgia:
"Courts necessarily must possess the means of punishing for con-
tempt when conduct tends directly to prevent the discharge of their
functions including the authority and power . . . to, assure litigants
a fair trial."5 5 By emasculating the newsman's privilege and by
issuing orders of contempt, the 'California Courts definitely possess
the 'means of punishment', but prior to any invasion of -freedom
of the press by the demand for the revelation of news sources. A
direct interference with a litigant's right to a fair trial should be
demonstrated.
Basic to the judicial system is the premise that courts have the
right to conduct their business in an untrammeled way with the
53. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 71 n. 5, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349 n. 5.
54. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 224, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427,
450.
55. 370 U.S. 375, 383 (1972).
means of punishing for contempt to maintain order and to assure
litigants a fair trial.50 Nevertheless, it remains to be determined
what exactly constitutes the proper circumstances which mandate
the court to exercise such power.
The California legislature has not provided a statute that directly
applies to punishment of publications outside the court room which
comment upon a pending case, although there is a line of judicial
decisions resting on the assumption that the right to hold one guilty
of contempt is inherently necessary to judicial administration and
that the legislature should not interfere with the determination of
what constitutes direct or constructive contempt.5 7
In determining the appropriate circumstances for the exercise of
this inherent power, federal and state courts have alternated
between two standards: a reasonable likelihood of interference
with the administration of justice"8 and the clear and present
danger test.5 9
In assessing whether the refusal to reveal the sources of
information of an editorial or an article commenting upon a pending
action rendered the author guilty of contempt of court, the test
that had been applied by the California courts was whether it had
a 'reasonable tendency' to interfere with the orderly administration
of justice in the action which was the subject of the comment.60
56. Id.; Craemer v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 225, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 193, 201 (1968); People v. Sidener, 58 Cal. 2d 645, 375 P.2d 641, 75
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Millholen v. Riley, 211 Cal. 29, 293 P. 69 (1930); see
cases cited note 57 infra.
57. Times Mirror Company v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 99, 98 P.2d 1029
(1940); Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 94 P.2d 983 (1939);
Blodgett v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. 1, 290 P. 293 (1930); In re Shuler, 210
Cal. 377, 292 P. 481 (1930); Lamberson v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 458, 91
P. 100 (1907); McClatchy v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. 413, 51 P. 696 (1897);
In re Lindsley, 75 Cal. App. 122, 241 P. 934 (1915). All of these cases held
that CAL. CODE Civ. PRO. § 1209, subd. 13 was unconstitutional as an invalid
legislative effort to abridge the inherent power of the court.
58. See notes 60 and 62 infra.
59. See notes 60 and 62 infra.
60. Times Mirror Company v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 99, 118, 98 P.2d
1029, 1039 (1940); Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 484, 94 P.2d
983, 989 (1939); In re San Francisco Chronicle, 1 Cal. 2d 630, 637, 36 P.2d
369, 371 (1934). The California courts found support for the reasonable
tendency test in Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 764 (1929) and in
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1907). The Sinclair court
stated:
• .. [H]aving regard to the powers conferred, to the protection
of society, to the honest and fair administration of justice and to
the evil to come from its obstruction, the wrong depends upon the
tendency of the acts to accomplish this result without reference
to the consideration of how far they may have been without influ-
ence in a particular case.
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In reviewing the California approach, the United States Supreme
Court in Bridges v. California6' severly limited the judicial power
to punish by holding that the appropriate test was 'clear and
present danger' and by explaining that before such danger can be
termed 'clear and present', the substantive evil must be extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. 2
The recent trend in California seems to depart from the standard
advocated in Bridges. In reaffirming a judgment of contempt, both
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 63 and the California Court of
And in Patterson, Justice Holmes stated:
Judges generally, perhaps, are less apprehensive that publications
impugning their own reasoning or motives will interfere with their
administration of the law. But if a court regards, as it may, a
publication concerning a matter of law before it, as tendency
toward such an interference, it may punish it.
61. 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
62. Although the clear and present danger test is not void of ambiguities
and criticisms, it does provide a higher standard than that of the reasonable
likelihood test.
. In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States has con-
sistently ruled that unless such proceedings are justified by a showing of
clear and present danger to the administration of justice, attempts to punish
such representations of the press are violative of the First Amendment
rights. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331 (1946). The court in Pennekamp, in balancing the two inter-
ests (free press-fair trial) explained: "The essential right of the courts
to be free of intimidation and coercion . . . is consonant with a recognition
that freedom of the press must be allowed in the broadest scope compatible
with the supremacy of order." Pennekamp v. Florida, supra at 334.
It should also be noted that the United States Supreme Court has sug-
gested that another test might apply when the representations of the press
are directed toward a trial by jury rather than toward a grand jury investi-
gation or a non-jury trial. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
(Bridges, Pennekamp, and Craig did not involve trials by jury and were
prior to the issuance of protective orders; all three cases involved the possi-
bility of coercion and intimidation through criticism of the presiding trial
judge.)
In a recent decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the clear
and present danger test and its application to pretrial publicity have been
called into question; see United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.
1969).
In light of the Supreme Court's decisions, the California courts have re-
versed contempt convictions when the evidence failed to establish that the
publication actually influenced and disrupted the trial. See Crosswhite v.
Municipal Court, 260 Cal. App. 2d 428, 67 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1968); compare
Hamilton v. Municipal Court, 270 Cal. App. 2d 797, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1969).
63. Farr v. Pitchess, 527 F.2d at 469. The Court held:
[U]nder the facts presented by this record, the paramount inter-
Appeal +4 contended that the 'conditional' newsman's privilege not
to disclose sources must yield to the more important and com-
pelling need for disclosure; neither court articulated whether it
relied on the clear and present danger test or the reasonable
tendency test. The language of the opinions implies the use of the
compelling state interest test. The compelling need for disclosure
was founded on the public interest in fair trial and on the need
to prevent the court from being thwarted in its efforts to enforce
its order against prejudicial publicity. In Rosato, the Court relied
on the "reasonable likelihood" that publication of grand jury
transcripts would endanger the defendant's right to a fair trial. 5
A frequent flaw in the recent California approach is two-fold.
First, the protective orders issued by the trial courts are designed
to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, and yet the courts
do not specifically find that the news releases prejudiced or inter-
ferred with the defendant's trial.60 Although the protective orders
were technically violated, their fundamental purpose was still
accomplished. Second, in punishing newsmen for the violation
without a determination that the particular publication actually
prejudiced the criminal trial, the courts are inappropriately ex-
tending the protective order beyond its original scope; it has be-
come a prior restraint on news publications. Before instituting
such a restraint, the courts must carry the "heavy burden of
showing justification for the imposition of a prior restraint.16 7
est to be protected was that of the power of the court to enforce
its duty and obligation relative to the guarantee of due process to
the defendants in the on-going trial.
64. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 73, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
The Court found:
Balancing as we are required to do, the interest to be served by
disclosure of sources against its potential inhibition upon the free
flow of information, we conclude that petitioner is not privileged
by the First Amendment to refuse to answer the questions put to
him in the trial court.
65. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 208, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427,
438-39. The Court held that since the protective order did not operate as
a direct restraint on newsmen, the "clear and present danger test" was not
applicable.
66. In Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1973),
a contempt judgment against a district attorney for violation of a publicity
protection order issued in a criminal trial was reversed. The court found
that the releases had in no way prejudiced the accused's right to a fair trial.
The Court did point out: "A sterile press release simply is not a good ve-
hicle with which to make law to the effect that the courts are powerless
to prevent harmful or potentially harmful publications by prior restraints."
Younger v. Smith, supra at 153, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
67. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); see
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707-09 (1931); Younger v. Smith (Times
Mirror v. Superior Court), 30 Cal. App. 3d at 154, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
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Furthermore, the courts have not been successful in applying pro-
tective orders directly against the press, 8 and three reports on
the free press-fair trial dilemma have stated that courts should
avoid direct influence over newsmen.69
The California courts claim that they are balancing the interest
to be served by disclosure of sources against the potential inhibi-
tion upon the free flow of information, but the decisions seem to
hinge on a judicial obsession with the power to enforce an Order
re Publicity. Consideration and weight should be given to the
possibility that no actual interference or prejudice to defendant's
right to a fair trial occurred; it is not enough that
If disclosure of the source of a violation may inhibit future
violations, the inhibition serves the public purpose . . . and de-
prives the public of only that information which that court has
The Court remarked that
[TIhe direct restraint against the media was impermissible...
where the record did not justify that portion of the trial court's
protective order restraining the news media from publication of
any matters with respect to the case except those occurring in
open court.
68. United States v. Dickinson and Adams, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972)
cert. denied 414 U.S. 979 (1973); Younger v. Smith (Times Mirror v. Su-
perior Court), 30 Cal. 3d 138, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1973). Further, a split
in opinion exists whether the clear and present danger test or the reasonable
likelihood test is the proper standard to apply to the issuance of protective
orders. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.
1975), 44 LW 2073 (Aug. 19, 1975) (reasonable likelihood test); In re Oliver,
452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971) (clear and present danger test); Chase v. Rob-
son, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970) (serious and imminent threat); United
States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969); Younger v. Smith (Times
Mirror Co. v. Superior Court), 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1973)
(reasonable likelihood test); compare Sun Company of San Bernadino v.
Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1973) (clear and
present danger test); see also United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.
1974); cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); (oral protective order, prohibiting
the press from publishing during perjury trial information regarding indict-
ments pending related matter, was vacated due to procedural deficiency and
failure to specify the terms of the order); Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d
558 (7th Cir. 1970) (protective order proscribing photographs, television and
radio during pending trial upheld).
69. The Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System
on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue (Kaufman Committee), 45 F.R.D. 391
(1968); The Report of the Special Committee on Radio, Television, and the
Administration of Justice of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Freedom of the Press and Fair Trial (the Medina Report) (1967);
The American Bar Association Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free
Press (the Reardon Report) (1968).
declared must be kept from it temporarily if the constitutional right
to a fair trial is to be preserved. 70
The proposal that future violations may be inhibited is too specu-
lative and vague to permit an intrusion of First Amendment rights.
Furthermore, in many instances the jury has been sequestered and
there is little or no danger of their being influenced by any
"inflammatory" publications; therefore, no legitimate reason exists
to keep the news from the public. California seems to treat too
lightly the inhibition upon the free flow of information and the
curtailment of newsmen's First Amendment rights and of the
public's right to know.
A court, in protecting the integrity of its proceedings from those
interferences which may accompany the exercise of certain activi-
ties otherwise protected by the First Amendment, 71 should apply
any restraint as narrowly as possible to be consistent with the pro-
tection of both the integrity of the judicial proceedings and the
exercise of individual constitutional rights.7 2  In Younger v.
Smith, the California Court of Appeal, Second District, noted:
The jurisdiction of courts to make pre-trial protective orders rests
squarely on their implied and inherent powers. The necessity for
such powers is well recognized. We do not deny it. Indeed our
decision in the third consolidated matter, the Busch petition, rests
on the application of such powers. At the same time, we must
recognize that the concept of implied and inherent powers poses
great dangers when, of necessity, their definition and application
is in the hands of those who wield them. Judicial supremacy must
rest on respect, not fear. Materially courts are the most impotent
branch of government. If, through lack of restraint and by
attempting to increase their powers unnecessarily they lose the
respect which makes them effective, they may soon find that, as
a practical matter, even powers that are now conceded to them, are
unenforceable. 73
In emphasizing their own implied and inherent powers, the Cali-
fornia Courts' recent decisions overlook many of the relevant
factors that must be taken into account prior to 'striking' a balance
between the interests involved.7 4  The decisions 75 are broader
than necessary if they are to suggest that the mere publishing of
70. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 73, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350.
71. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
72. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963); Chases v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
73. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 156, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
74. See infra at -.
75. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427
(1975); Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1972).
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a news release constitutes contempt without a finding of actual
interference with a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial.
To date, there is no United States Supreme Court decision disposi-
tive of the issues litigated in the California courts. In Branzburg
v. Hayes,76 the Supreme Court did face a closely related issue in
dealing with the obligation of newspaper reporters to identify their
sources in response to relevant questions during grand jury investi-
gations. In that situation the Court held:
On the record now before us, we perceive no basis for holding that
the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective
grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential,
but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result from
insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant
questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investiga-
tion or criminal trial.77
Thus, the Court clearly held that the First Amendment right of
newsmen to gather news and to refuse disclosure of sources is out-
weighed by the state interest in the grand jury's duty to ferret
out criminal activity. And in reference to issues similar to those
recently litigated in the California courts, the Court noted in
dictum:
... the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitu-
tional right of special access to information not available to the
public generally78 .... Newsmen have no constitutional right of
access to scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is ex-
cluded, and they may be prohibited from attending or publishing
information about trials if such restrictions are necessary to assure
a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. 79
Although it is still uncertain whether this statement is indicative
of the constitutional future of newsmen's First Amendment rights,
California seems to be fully supportive of this view. 0 Mr. Justice
76. 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (5-4 decision).
77. Id. at 690-91.
78. It has been generally held that the First Amendment does not guar-
antee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the public generally. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830-31
(1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d
883, 885 (3d Cir. 1958).
79. 408 U.S. at 684-85.
80. In Allegrezza v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 948, 951, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 245, 247 (1975) (hearing denied July 3, 1975), the Court denied the
press access to a hearing on the issue of the voluntariness of defendant's
Powell, in his concurring opinion suggests the limited nature' of the
holding in Branzburg and assures us that the "courts will be avail-
able to newsmen under circumstances where legitimate First
Amendment interests require protection.""' In Times-Picayune
Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp,8 2 Mr. Justice Powell, as
Circuit Judge, granted an application for a stay of a Louisiana
trial court's order restricting media coverage of trials of defendants
accused of committing a highly publicized rape by holding:
The task of reconciling First Amendment rights with the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is not an easy
one. The Court has observed in dictum that newsmen might be
prohibited from publishing information about trials if such restric-
tions were necessary to assure defendant a fair trial. (Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 885). There was no indication in that opinion,
however, that the standards for determining the propriety of resort
to such action would materially differ from those applied in other
decisions involving prior restraint of speech and publication.8 3
The basic principle distilled from the opinions expressed by the
Justices of the Supreme Court is that a court can and should protect
its processes from prejudicial outside interference; however, the
Court has not at this time promulgated any rules directly regulat-
ing the activity of the news media.84
confession on the basis that defendant would "likely" be denied a fair trial
by pretrial publication of defendant's alleged confession. See also Craemer
v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968).
81. 408 U.S. at 709-10.
82. 419 U.S. 1301 (1974).
83. Id. at 1307. See supra note 64.
84. The United States Supreme Court has agreed to consider this spring
(1976) the constitutional validity of a pre-trial gag order which was issued
on the basis of the clear and present danger test in the multiple-murder
trial of Erwin Charles Simants. The order prohibited the press from report-
ing the defendant's confession and other matters potentially damaging to
the defense. (Simants was found guilty on Jan. 17, 1976 and sentenced to
die in the electric chair.)
Justice Blackmun, as Circuit Judge, stayed portions of the order but up-
held those portions which barred disclosure of any confession or other state-
ment that could harm the accused. In partially lifting the trial court's order
restricting press coverage of pretrial proceedings, Mr. Justice Blackmun ex-
plained:
No persuasive justification has been advanced for those parts of
the restrictive order that prohibit the reporting of the details of
the crimes, of the identities of the victims, or of the testimony of
the pathologist at the preliminary hearing that was open to the
public.
The governing principle is that the press, in general, is to be
free and unrestrained and that the facts are presumed to be in
public domain. The accused, and the prosecution if it joins him,
bears the burden of showing that publicizing particular facts will
irreparably impair the ability of those exposed to them to reach
an independent and impartial judgment as to guilt.
The five justices (Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justices Blackmun,
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Dicta in previous Supreme Court rulings suggest that the press's
asserted claim to the newsmen's privilege will be judged on the
facts of each case by the 'striking' of a delicate balance between
the freedom of the press and the right of a defendant to a fair
trial. Dicta in several cases indicate that the defendant's right to
a fair trial outweighs the First Amendment rights of a newsman;8 5
but, prior to such a holdng, past decisions would require that offi-
cial action with adverse impact on First Amendment rights be justi-
fied by a public interest that is compelling or paramount.8 6 Fur-
thermore, the most recent opinions outlined above suggest the
application of the clear and present danger test where First Amend-
ment rights are concerned and a showing of irreparable harm if
there is a prior restraint.
It still remains unclear whether California newsmen are being
'punished' for their publications or for their failure to comply with
a court order and alleged interference with the administration of
justice. If it is for the latter reasons, the finding of a prior restraint
would be eliminated, and therefore, the necessity of showing irrep-
arable harm. On the other hand, the accepted standard could
become that a refusal to disclose confidential sources does not auto-
matically interfere with the administration of justice but actual
interference must be decided on the facts of each case. If the Cali-
fornia approach actually constitutes a prior restraint, then the
striking of a balance in favor of fair trial is insufficient without
finding irreparable harm to the State's compelling interest in
Powell, Rehnquist and White) who formed the majority in Branzburg v.
Hayes all voted to reject the Nebraska press's request to ban the 'gag' order.
Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 251 (1975) (Docket No. 75-817),
88 Los Angeles Daily Journal No. 239 at 1 (November 21, 1975); subse-
quently the Nebraska Supreme Court in State of Nebraska v. Simants, -
Neb. -, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975) (Charles Simants case) modified and rein-
stated the trial court's order limiting the ban to confessions and statements
against interest.
85. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969);
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958); cert. denied 358 U.S. 910
(1958); Allegrezza v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 948, 126 Cal. Rptr.
245 (1975); People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr.
385 (1972).
86. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 700; De Gregory v. Attorney General
of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
at 439; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
protecting a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial and the court's
power to control its proceedings and officers.
CONCLUSION
A fair resolution of the issues involved is of tantamount
importance to the press, the public, the criminal defendant, and the
courts. The high value placed on freedom of expression necessitates
that any restriction be closely examined and that no restraints not
justified by a clear necessity be suffered to develop. There should
be actual evidence as opposed to speculation of a nexus between
the alleged contemptuous conduct and any interference with a
defendant's right to a fair trial and the court's power to maintain
order in its proceedings.
The California courts suggest that the importance of the fair trial
guarantee to criminal defendants is greater than the First Amend-
ment rights of the press. Farr and Rosato are the only two Cali-
fornia cases on point. The result in both cases is unacceptable in
that there was no finding of actual interference with the adminis-
tration of justice.
A comparison of the standard applied in California's recent
treatment in citing newsmen with contempt for refusing to disclose
confidential sources and its previous approach to publicity and its
effect on the issuance of protective orders, contempt citations, and
reversals of criminal convictions demonstrates an inconsistency.8 7
Instead of relying on the clear and present danger test and a find-
ing of actual interference, California resorts to a lesser standard:
whether the publication creates a reasonable likelihood that the
defendant will be denied a fair trial. A more precise standard
should be applied before First Amendment rights are restricted.
Although it is difficult to measure the extent to which informers
will be deterred from furnishing information and the extent to
which the flow of news will be impaired when newsmen are
required to disclose their sources, available data indicates that sub-
stantial reliance is placed by newsmen on confidential sources.88
It is not denied that the news media has the potential ability
to interfere with a defendant's right to a fair trial, but under the
87. See infra.
88. See affidavits filed by nationally known newsmen in Brief for Ap-
pellant, In re Caldwell appeal docketed, No. 26025, 9th Cir. April 17, 1970;
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) rev'g Caldwell v. United States,
434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). Farr already claims that as a result of his
honoring the confidentiality of his sources, his professional functioning has
increased. Northrup Lecture supra note 15.
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circumstances presented in the recent California cases this right was
not in issue. In balancing the critical interests involved, newsmen
should not be forced to disclose their sources or be held in contempt
for refusing to do so until an actual nexus has been demonstrated
between prejudicial publicity and the denial of a fair trial.
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